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Introduction
One main advantage of considering information from empirical measures of tax progressivity lies in its twofolded informational content. With micro-level data information at hand, descriptions of pre-tax income distribution can be analyzed jointly with either the distribution of tax burdens, as according to the disproportionality measure (Kakwani, 1977) , or the distribution of income after shaping from tax schemes, as in redistributional effect procedures (beginning with Musgrave and Thin, 1948). The tax policymaker can then assess to what extent the tax system decreases income disparities, by addressing information on distributions of tax burdens and of post-tax and pre-tax incomes. As tax policies often are discussed in an intertemporal perspective, for instance because governments are evaluated with respect to their efforts to redistribute income, information from tax progressivity measures is advantageous: trends in inequality of pre-tax income distributions can be held up against changes in distributions of taxes or post-tax income.
Trends in tax progressivity are obviously influenced by a number of factors. Not the least from a policymaking perspective, it is of great interest to isolate the effects of tax policies in order to obtain a better understanding of the driving forces behind a particular observed pattern. The literature has offered some suggestions to obtain more detailed information on tax policy effects, and two such efforts are the approaches proposed by Kasten, Sammartino and Toder (1994) and Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) . Kasten, Sammartino and Toder (1994) suggest to identify effects of tax policy changes through a "fixed-income" approach, which means that pre-tax income distributions are kept fixed, a base year being chosen and exposed to taxation as per the various tax schemes of the period. Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) propose to compare post-tax distributions that have been adjusted to a common base regime, in which differences in pre-tax income inequality have been eliminated: this is the so-called "transplant-and-compare" approach.
The main contribution of this paper comes by applying each approach to the evaluation of tax policy in Norway 1992 Norway -2004 . In so doing, we expose their respective strengths and weaknesses. A main criterion is that results should not be sensitive to the choice of base year, when the methodologies are employed in order to rank tax progressivity effects of tax schemes. On this ground, as well as for ease of application, transparency and informational requirements generally, we find that the transplant-and-compare procedure has a number of advantages.
Our study employs the Blackorby-Donaldson index of redistributional effect (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1984) in order to measure global tax progressivity. This measure is normative in the sense that it is rooted in social welfare function reasoning, in line with Atkinson (1970) . The overall redistributional effect is decomposed into a vertical effect and a horizontal inequity effect, under the view that horizontal equity violations are separated and controlled for in order to describe the vertical performance of the tax system. Estimates of horizontal inequity are derived according to two main perceptions of tax systems' vertical effects; the "classical view" (Musgrave, 1990 ) and the "no reranking perspective" (Atkinson, 1980; Plotnick, 1981) . The former identifies vertical redistribution as the average effect on relative income differentials, while the latter defines the vertical effect as the transformation from the given pre-tax income distribution to the given post-tax income distribution that would not create procedural unfairness, in terms of rank reversals. The indices of horizontal inequity that are employed rest upon the same social welfare function foundation as the BlackorbyDonaldson index, described for the classical approach by Duclos and Lambert (2000) and for the no reranking approach by King (1983) and Jenkins (1994) .
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the BlackorbyDonaldson index of tax progressivity, and we introduce the associated measures of vertical redistribution and horizontal inequity. In section 3 we present a series of tax progressivity measures for Norway 1992-2004, each conditioned by that year's income distribution, in order to set the scene for our subsequent isolation and analysis of tax policy effects. The two methods to distinguish the effects of tax policies from those of distributional change over the period, the fixed-income and transplant-and-compare methods, are presented and contrasted in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of its main findings.
The Blackorby-Donaldson tax progressivity measure and associated measures
The redistributional effect measured by the Blackorby-Donaldson index
Decompositions of redistribution (RE) into vertical effects (VR) and horizontal inequity (HI) have
been undertaken in terms of various inequality indices. In each case, the decomposition takes the form horizontal inequity enters as a deduction from the vertical redistribution component, which signifies that the overall redistributive effect is reduced by presence of horizontal inequity, or in other words:
measures of the vertical stance of the tax system (VR) usually have a higher value than the overall redistributive effect (RE), since the horizontal effect (HI) reduces the actual redistributional performance of the tax system. In this perspective the tax breaks that cause horizontal inequity are measured as costs of foregone redistribution, see Ramos and Lambert (2003) for more on this.
Here we derive RE in terms of the Blackorby-Donaldson index (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1984 , henceforth BD). It measures progressivity as the proportionate increase in equality relative to the initial level of equality. Its dependency on the initial level of equality (one minus inequality in pre-tax income) implies that it will evaluate a tax system as more progressive, when for the same improvement from the pre-tax income distribution to the post-tax income distribution, the initial pre-tax income distribution is more unequal. Subscripts x and y denote pre-tax and post-tax income respectively.
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The BD index is founded on a social welfare function reasoning, as it employs the Atkinson (1970) index I(e) as inequality measure. We let e be the (relative) inequality aversion parameter, capturing the concavity of the assumed utility function of a social decision-maker (henceforth SDM). The more concave this utility function is, the greater the net utility gain from any given rich-to-poor transfer. Higher values of e correspond to greater social valuations of equality. Let ξ define the level of income which, if equally distributed amongst all persons, would give the same level of social welfare as the original distribution. Because of the concavity, average utility of income falls short of what would pertain if the distribution were equal -the more so, the higher is e. The
Atkinson measure of inequality I(e), which is given as
where µ is average income, measures the percentage of all income which could be given up, with no loss of social welfare if the remainder were distributed equally. Almost all income would be sacrificed in order to achieve equality when e approaches infinity. 1 For practical purposes, using micro data derived from a sample survey, the following measure is employed (here with respect to pre-tax income, x):
where w i is the weight of observation i.
The BD index, as defined by equations (2) and (4), can be perceived as measuring the proportion of after-tax income the SDM would pay to convert a flat-tax system into the given one (see the appendix in Duclos and Lambert, 2000, for more on this). This definition of the BD index highlights the "cost of inequality" interpretation that usually can be given to measures based on the Atkinson index of inequality. However, the costs are here "costs of proportional taxation". This amount increases the more progressive the tax system is, and the more inequality-averse the SDM is.
Horizontal inequity
Horizontal inequity can be seen as a violation of the principle of horizontal equity; the "equal treatment" of "equals", a basic command of tax design (Musgrave, 1990). We may represent horizontal inequity by employing two different suggestions seen in the literature, the "classical" and the "no reranking" approaches. Both are based on essentially the same social welfare foundation as the BD index.
a. Classical
The classical approach to horizontal inequity measurement starts from a perception of the vertical effect, VR in equation (1) (2000) suggest to define the equals by "banding", but instead of imposing these bands "exogenously", they let the equals be identified by statistical methods: the kernel smoothing technique, which implies that standard statistical methods for bandwidth selection can be employed. The cost of inequality within each band j defines horizontal inequity, where the cost is defined by the difference between average post-tax income and the equally distributed equivalent, j ξ . The definition of HI is, thus, kept within the same social welfare approach as the index of redistributional effect. The amount the SDM is willing to give up in order to eliminate HI within group j is defined by:
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where subscript k refers to person k within equal-group j (note that the sorting is already done through the kernel procedure), and where j µ is average post-tax income in group j. While e represented inequality aversion in equation (4) ∈ and subscript C symbolizes classical approach Second, the aggregate measure is turned into a unit free index by dividing by the overall average post-tax income, y µ :
This index of classical horizontal inequity is invariant with respect to scale, i.e., invariant to equiproportionate post-tax income change.
Our measure of the vertical effect under classical horizontal inequity, symbolized by VR C , is derived by adding the horizontal effect to the overall measure of redistribution, BD ∏ :
Hence, when discussing classical vertical redistribution in the following, the term "classical" refers to the method of measuring horizontal inequity, which in turn has bearing on the measurement of vertical redistribution.
b. No reranking
The "no reranking" procedure arises from the perception that if individuals are reranked in the transformation from pre-tax income to post-tax income, this amounts to procedural unfairness (Atkinson, 1980; Plotnick, 1981 Just as for the classical measure, the no reranking measure of horizontal inequity is invariant to equiproportionate post-tax income change.
Trends in tax progressivity: Norway 1992-2004
In order to set the scene for our examination of tax policy effects in Norway, we evaluate horizontal and vertical trends in tax progressivity using the measures just described and data for the period from The tax progressivity index that is employed in the current analysis and its decomposition into vertical and horizontal effects involves selecting values for the inequality aversion parameter, e, and for the horizontal inequity parameters, f and a, representing aversion to horizontal inequity under the classical approach and the no reranking procedure, respectively. In the following we present results
for the values 0.25 e = and 0.75 e = , which replicate parameter choices of Duclos and Lambert (2000) with respect to Canadian data. In order to allow for an alternative that puts a higher value on rich to poor transfers in the case of Norway, we also present results for 1.25 e = .
7 Parameter choices for overall inequality aversion must, of course, be combined with choices of horizontal inequity aversion in order to invoke our measurement system. After some experimentation and with the benefit of . We discuss the sensitivity of horizontal inequity rankings with respect to parameter values in Appendix B.
The kernel procedure of the classical approach involves computational choices, even if it can be argued that this procedure to identify equals is less restrictive than other suggestions (Duclos and Lambert, 2000) . The "close equals groups" are defined by employing a Gaussian kernel function 8 where the optimal bandwidth is approximated by Silverman's rule of thumb (Silverman, 1986), and sample weights are utilized in order to control for representativity. The number of grid points is set to 500. Appendix B also reports results of altering the number of grid points.
In order to approach the normative and decompositional characteristics of tax progressivity, Table 1 presents figures for some of the components of the progressivity indices.
Information for three years in the period under consideration is given; 1992, 1998 and 2004;
calculations for each year are presented for the combinations ( 0.25
) and ( 1.25 e = , 0.75 f = , 0.05 a = ). As described by equation (4), the
Atkinson indices for pre-tax and post-tax income, I x and I y , are constructed from estimates of average 5 Ebert's method 4 uses the "equivalent adult" as the unit of analysis. We return to this later in the paper. 6 Negative incomes mainly stem from capital loss realizations. The procedure deletes not more than 0.3 percent of the original samples. One extreme observation at the high end of the 1998 post-tax income distribution has also been taken out, see footnote 21. 7 In accordance with the impression that there may be a high degree of inequality aversion in Scandinavian countries. Such attitudes, however, remain to be identified; see Lambert, Millimet and Slottje (2003) on inequality aversion across countries. 8 One should be aware that a Gaussian kernel is not the only kernel available, see Chapter 3 in Silverman (1986).
incomes and of the equally distributed equivalents (ξ ). The Atkinson index increases monotonically with e; for instance the inequality in post-tax income in 1992 increases from 2.4 percent for 0.25 e = to 12.1 percent for 1.25 e = . If there is more inequality, the Atkinson index increases, the SDM becoming willing to accept a lower level of equally distributed income in order to eliminate income differences. The estimate of 12.1 percent means that, if incomes were equally distributed, only 87.9 percent (100% 12.1% − ) of total income in 1992 would be required to achieve exactly the same level of total welfare. Inequality in both post-tax and pre-tax income increases over the time period. This is clearly not explained by uniform income growth, as the index is invariant with respect to scale. Table 1 presents cost measures of horizontal inequity, cf. equation (7), 9 both for the classical approach and the no reranking procedure. We see that for 0.25 e = and 0.25 f = the SDM is willing to pay a "fee" of NOK79 of post-tax income per person in order to eliminate classical horizontal inequity in 1992, which means that the equal welfare level without horizontal inequity is rather close to average post-tax income. There is less classical horizontal inequity for smaller fees. In other words, a small fee indicates that there is good correspondence between tax burdens of persons with similar pre-tax incomes. 10 Table 1 also confirms, as we would expect, that the SDM is willing to pay more to eliminate classical HI as f increases. Note that classical HI, as defined in this study, is independent of the choice of overall inequality aversion. This is in contrast to the no reranking measure employed in this study, which depends upon values of both e and a, see equation (9). According to the no reranking approach, the estimated costs in 1992 for 0.25 e = and 0.025 a = are NOK225, which means that the SDM is willing to pay NOK225 per person in order to abolish reranking of individuals in the transition from the pre-tax to the post-tax income distribution. 11 HI NR , which is independent of scale, measures these costs in proportion to mean post-tax income. As noted above, horizontal inequity according to the no reranking criterion is associated with procedural unfairness of the tax system, while classical horizontal inequity is rooted in the unfair treatment of persons within groups, cf. e.g., Jenkins and Lambert (1999) . . This trend is downward, however it is less marked for the latter choice of inequality aversion (cf. There is a close relationship between this procedure and income inequality measurement by the Atkinson index, as costs are derived from equally distributed post-tax incomes within equals-groups, see Section 2 above. 11 Such "abolition" would involve reassigning the given post-tax income values to persons in accordance with their pre-tax ranks. See Lambert (2001), chapter 10, for more on this. 12 Remember that alternatives of inequality aversion parameters are combined with choices of horizontal inequity. 13 The standard errors are not reported, but are in general low. We find 95 percent confidence intervals smaller than 1 ± percent, as also reported by Duclos and Lambert (2000) . . This means that the SDM would pay about 3.5 percent of post-tax income to convert an equal-welfare flat tax into the existing tax schedule. So far, the literature offers rather few BD index estimates, to which these results can be compared. However, according to Canadian figures, reported in Duclos and Lambert (2000) , the corresponding progressivity fee in 1994 of a Canadian SDM is nearly 50 percent. 14 The lower panel of Figure 1 shows that the fee to convert an equal-welfare flat tax rate into the extisting tax rises above 6 percent in 1994, when it is assumed that the SDM is more inequality-averse ( 1.25 e = ). Ebert (1997) argues that one should employ artificial distributions with "equivalent adults" as the unit of analysis (not the individual, as here), as this is in accordance with a social welfare approach. However, sensitivity tests reveal that orderings of years with respect to tax progressivity do not change when employing equivalent persons as unit of analysis.
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With respect to trends in horizontal inequity, Figure 1 shows a rather stable pattern over the period, both according to the classical approach (HI C ) and especially as per the no reranking , the divergent results according to the no reranking procedure come from variations in e.
When e increases, there is more emphasis on rerankings at the lower end of the distribution, which
indicates that there has been a change in the distribution of rerankings between 1992 and 2004.
Vertical redistribution according to both the classical and no reranking approaches has essentially been in decline throughout the period. Of course, these estimates conflate the effects of changing demographic and cyclical factors, that influence pre-tax distribution, with those of the tax schedule itself. One would reasonably expect that changes in tax schemes have contributed in a major way to these trends. In the rest of this paper we discuss results of two different methods to determine such contributions.
Tax policy evaluations
Time trends in tax progressivity estimates conflate both trends in the distribution of pre-tax income and effects of tax policy changes carried out over the time period. In this section, first we describe the main features of the Norwegian tax system in the period 1992-2004, and then we apply two different methodologies to isolate the effects on progressivity, vertical redistribution and horizontal inequity of these tax changes.
The Norwegian income tax, 1992-2004
The reform of 1992 entailed the adoption of a dual income tax system (see Sørensen, 1998), with a single basic tax rate of 28 per cent for both capital and labor income. In addition, wage income and incomes from self-employment were subject to a social security tax and a two-tier surtax, with rates of 9.5 percent commencing at NOK200,000 and 13 percent tax starting at NOK225,000. The surtax is, of course, a key progressivity-maintaining feature of the tax system. This part of the tax system has undergone substantial changes over the subsequent period. By 2004, the first rate had increased to 13.5 percent and kicked in at NOK354,300, while the second rate had risen to 19.5 percent, starting at NOK906,900. The combination of exemption and rate increases makes the overall effect difficult to gauge by only considering statutory tax-law regulations. Such changes reinforce the demand for micro data analysis.
Dividends, mainly an income source for high-income earners in Norway, were taxed at the individual level in 2001, prior to which they had been taxed at the corporate level only. This tax meant less profits transferred to individuals and more corporate savings. 16 It was widely believed that the individual tax would be temporary, which was shown to be true.
Several characteristics of the Norwegian tax system represent potential sources of horizontal inequity. Obviously, the dual income tax system implies that taxpayers may face different tax burdens, dependent on income composition, for the same size of income. There are also special tax breaks for individuals living in the northernmost parts of the country, for charitable giving and for mortgage interest, along with a joint filing scheme for married couples. Obviously, these tax breaks may serve respectable social goals, such as maintaining population figures in the north, promoting home ownership, and so on. As noted in Section 2, these special treatments are assessed here in terms of costs of foregone redistribution.
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The Kasten-Sammartino-Toder procedure Kasten, Sammartino and Toder (1994), henceforth KST, isolate effects of tax policy changes on progressivity through a fixed-income approach, which means holding the pre-tax income distribution fixed and letting it be exposed to taxation as per the tax schemes of the period. 18 This method might provide robust measures of tax-policy effects over time: for example, one particular tax scheme might be seen to dominate all others with respect to distributional effects. However, KST reported that their results were not independent of which base year was chosen for the tax law comparisons.
KST based their evaluations on measures of effective tax rates by quintiles. In our application, we use the summary measures presented in Section 2. In accordance with KST, we present results for several pre-tax income distribution bases; we choose those of 1992, 1998, and 2004.
For each of these data sets, we let individuals be exposed to taxation as per the tax laws of 1992, 1995, Secondly, results are necessarily sensitive to how we define pre-tax income. In this study we employ a rather broad measure, which includes transfers. These transfers themselves may be subject to regulation over time, and thereby affect the pre-tax income distribution as well as the posttax distribution. For example, when we exposed the 2004 base distribution to previous changes in the child benefit, we found that by making a concomitant change in the base (pre-tax) distribution itself, we got significantly different results from those obtained by ignoring this adjustment.
The Dardanoni-Lambert approach
Dardanoni and Lambert (2002), henceforth DL, suggest another method of transplanting one tax system into another, in order to undertake tax progressivity comparisons over time, based on the same motivational underpinning that applies to the approach of KST. The basic idea is that one schedule be imported into the income distribution of the other, controlling for inequality differences between the two regimes (or from both of them into a common regime). Distributional comparisons after such importation are guaranteed invariant to the choice of baseline if candidate distributions are isoelastic transformations of one another. An isoelastic function takes the form
Making an isoelastic transformation means that pre-tax income distributions, in logarithms, differ only by location and scale, or in terms of the log of equation (11), differ only by the intercept ln A and the slope parameter b.
More formally, if we think of an income schedule N as mapping pre-tax income, x, into post-tax income, y, the DL procedure is based on finding a deformation function, g(x) that defines a modified post-tax income schedule Table C1 in Appendix C clearly show that incorporating a measure for the estimated residual in (12) is advantageous, in order to reproduce pre-tax income inequalities. Thus, we used: This method holds the promise of providing base-independent results. We examine this issue by providing empirical results with respect to various base years in the following.
The results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 2 . Table 2 reflect differences in scale or spread between the two distributions at hand. For instance, the slope parameter of the example we discussed above, in which pre-tax log income of 1992 is regressed on pre-tax log income of 2004, is 0.754. This signifies that the pre-tax income distribution of 1992 is significantly less dispersed than the 2004 distribution. As noted above, the goodness-of-fit measure, 2 R , is the key indicator of the isoelastic link, which is essential within this approach. The measures of 2 R in Table 2 are generally high; never below 0.9 and mainly in the range 0.95-0.99. However, it remains to be inferred at what level of goodness-of-fit this procedure can be safely undertaken, or in other words: what does it mean to say that "the isoelastic form is satisfied"? We suggest discussing this issue in terms of how well the fitted distributions are able to reproduce the pre-tax income distributions they are intended to represent. These types of model evaluations are shown in Appendix C. There we also show that results to some extent depend on whether we let the dependent variable represent pre-tax income or employ the fitted distributions.
Next, estimates from Table 2 
Conclusion
Over time descriptions of tax progressivity are important components of tax policy evaluations. The twofold informational content of tax progressivity measures raises an important possibility to isolate effects of tax policy changes in order to improve on the understanding of driving forces behind a particular observed pattern. The current analysis has employed the only two methods yet put forward in the literature; the fixed-income and the transplant-and-compare approaches. The first method keeps incomes fixed and makes tax schemes comparable by inflating or deflating different tax laws to a common base year, while the second, the transplant-and-compare procedure, adjusts schedules on the basis of changes that have occurred in pre-tax distributions. We find that only the latter procedure is able to produce robust results, i.e., results that are independent of base year when ordering progressivity effects of tax schemes.
The results of the fixed-income procedure did not yield any illuminating insights, and were also found to be sensitive to income definitions and to the choice of factors used to inflate or deflate tax systems to base years. Employing a tax scale invariant measure, such as the Kakwani measure, might counteract the latter problem: we are not convinced that the combination of the Blackorby-Donaldson measure and the fixed-income approach to identify tax policy effects can be recommended. One should also be aware that the fixed-income approach might be technically more demanding than the transplant-and-compare procedure, as it requires some sort of tax-benefit modelling technology.
Given that the transplant-and-compare procedure appears to yield both sensible and robust results, it is worth emphasizing that data are derived from a fairly "stable society": even if the time period is long, incomes and income distributions develop gradually. It would be interesting to see if the isoelastic form provides a reasonable fit to data of other countries, as well.
This analysis also shows clearly the potential of the normative approach to tax progressivity measurement of Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) , when supplemented by commensurate indices of vertical redistribution and horizontal inequity. Because it is based on a social welfare function, this approach yields estimates of the monetary cost of removing tax inequities with no welfare loss, which will have natural appeal to policy makers as well as being in the general tradition of measurement in other areas of public economics. The use of the BD and associated indices has shown, though, that results with respect to intertemporal horizontal inequity are to some extent sensitive to which approach is followed, the classical or the no reranking, and to the assumptions required for the procedures (e.g. parameter values for inequality and horizontal inequity aversion). Our recommendation is that one should be aware of such sensitivity, but not let it get in the way, as valuable information on tax schemes can be derived through such applications.
Appendix A. Let us first consider the degree of correspondence between fitted pre-tax income distributions and the observed income distributions they are fitted to. Note that the fitted distributions are derived by employing estimates of intercept and slope together with random draws from a normal distribution with zero mean, and estimates of the root square-mean error as measures of the standard deviation, as in equation (13) above, but with x i replacing y i . The estimates in parentheses in Table C1 are summary measures of pre-tax income inequality for the three pre-tax income distributions that are used as dependent variables under the DL approach in Section 4, and these estimates are contrasted to measures of inequality that follow from the fitted distributions. Table CI also presents estimates of pre-tax inequality when the error term component is omitted from the reproduction equation.
Undoubtedly, the fit is poorer under this alternative. Table C1 reveals that deviations between inequalities of fitted distributions and of the actual distributions they intend to reproduce do not exceed 12 percent. The main impression is that the transplantation method underestimates pre-tax inequality, which indicates that even if the fit is good and parameter estimates are supplemented by a stochastic element through random draws, the full extent of data variance might be difficult to replicate. However, results are not entirely consistent in that respect; pre-tax inequality in 2004 is overrated by the 2004-fitted pre-tax income distribution of 1992.
Another notable finding is that transplants based on the pre-tax distribution of 2001 deliver the poorest results according to all the three cases of Table C1 . As discussed in Section 3, the temporary tax on dividends in 2001 is expected to have had a major effect on incomes of high-income earners. Has this shifted the basic form of the income distribution in that year, which makes it less suitable for this type of location-scale transplant procedure? The measures of 2 R in Table 2 The results of the transplant-and-compare procedure in Section 4 are produced using estimates from the OLS regressions with respect to both pre-tax and post-tax income distributions. To get further information on the significance of any lack of fit, we examine if intertemporal tax policy orderings are affected if we let pre-tax distributions be represented by actual distributions instead of fitted ones. In Table C2 we compare orderings, both according to classical and no reranking vertical redistribution, when measures of pre-tax inequality are derived from fitted distributions (the approach in Section 4) and from actual distributions. Table C2 shows that results to some extent depend on this choice. When actual pre-tax distributions are employed, the tax scheme of 2001 becomes the one with most vertical redistribution (the → indicates an increase) according to 1998 and 2004 pre-tax income bases. As seen in Table C1 , the estimates of inequality in 2001 based on transplants tend to understate actual pre-tax inequality.
Furthermore, results are no longer independent of base. 
